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We wish to design a resistance movement in such a way that k subversions and the resulting 
betrayals do not totally destroy our network. Such graphs will be called k-secure. Subject to 
this restriction we determine which graphs minimize the expected number of betrayals. 
1. Ilamduction 
Any underground resistance movement can be modeled graph-theoretically by 
letting the vertices of the graph represent the various members of the under- 
ground, and the edges represent lines of communication. In this paper we address 
ourselves to some aspects of one of the fundamental weaknesses of any such 
underground movement. We are referring to the problem of internal security. 
If G is the graph modeling the network, and if x is any vertex in G, then clearly 
x can betray both itself, and the set N(x) consisting of all its neighbours in G. If 
by some agency, the 6 vertices x1,. . . , xb in G are subverted, they will betray the 
set {xl,. . . , q,} U IV(q). Note that in general there will be some overlap in this 
union of betrayed sets. We call the set {x1, . , . , q,} a subversive strategy on 6 
vertices, and if we denote this strategy by Cg, we let the total number of vertices 
betrayed by this strategy be given by &(G, 6). 
For a given graph G, and a given number 6, there are of course (I:‘) distinct 
subversive strategies on 6 vertices. We define the following symbols: 
where % ranges through the set of all possible strategies on 6 vertices, 
SW3 6) = c WG 6) 
‘6 
where, as before, 6 is fixed and the sum is taken over all possible strategies on 6 
vertices, 
RK(G, b)= SK(G, 6)/(‘7j. 
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For the sake of brevity, the number K(G, 6) is called the KGB number of the 
graph G. Similarly, RK(G, 6) is called the random KGB number of G. 
Now, for given numbers p and b, it is of interest o describe those graphs G on 
p vertices for which the KGB number is minimal. We therefore introduce one 
more symbol: 
1w(p, b) = min{K(G, b) 1 ICI= p}. 
G 
In 131, we investigated the dual problem of finding a formula for K(p, b), and of 
finding graphs G on p vertices whose KGB number in fact was equal to K(p, b). 
These results provide answers to the question of how to minimize betrayal effects 
in an underground resistance containing p members, b of which betray the 
movement, regardless of where these b vertices are located. 
It may be argued that this aim is unrealistic. For a given graph G, it is by no 
means obvious at first glance which particular strategy will maximize the number 
of betrayals. Thus, unless the internal structure of the underground is already 
intimately known (in which case, the revolution is surely foredoomed), it is not 
likely that the network G will in fact be attacked by a subversive strategy % for 
which K% (G, b) = K(G, b). It might consequently be more realistic to design the 
lines of communication in such a way that the effects of random subversions are 
minimized. On the assumption that, at least initially, any two subversive strategies 
are equally likely, one then tries to find graphs G for which the numbers 
SK(G, b), or equivalently, RK(G, b), are minimized. This question was dealt with 
briefly in [4], where it is shown that the trees G on p vertices that minimize, or 
maximize, the number RK(G, b) are respectively the star or the path on p 
vertices. It is relevant to note here that the path G on p vertices which is the tree 
with maximal random KGB number has two end-vertices; whereas the star for 
which .RK(G, b) is minimal for all connected graphs, has p - 1 end-vertices. We 
shall investigate various relationships between the number of end-vertices in a 
graph G and the number SK(G, b) in the latter part of this paper. 
It should also be noted that the star on p vertices, which minimizes the number 
RK(G, b), and hence also SK(G, b), has a major disadvantage as a model of an 
underground resistance movement. We refer here to the fact that any subversive 
strategy % containing the center of the star will totally betray G, and so, in 
particular, G can be totally betrayed by a single subversion at the center. To 
defend against ri 3~ effect, we investrgate graphs G that are k-secure. By this we 
mean &at any 31 bversive strategy on G containing fewer than k + 1 vertices will 
leave at least one vertex in G unbetrayed. As might he expected, this additional 
insurance on G must be paid for by an increase in the random KGB number. 
We shall display an elementary method for computing this change. 
2. Some w3ilts 
We note first that if T is a spanning tree of a given graph G which is being 
attacked by a subversive strategy %, then &(G, b) 2 &( T, b). Since we wish to 
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minimize the number of betrayals, we may without loss restrict ourselves to trees. 
We will make use of the following simple procedure by which an arbitrary tree 
T on p vertices can be grown one vertex at a time from the path PP. We let 
diam T= n-l, and let TO=(ur,. . . , u,,} be one diameter of ‘I: We label the 
vertices of PP successively ul, . . . , a,,_,, ol, . . . , u,, and call PP = T& Now choose 
u,,+ltzT-TOsuch that u,,+~ is adjacent to some 4 in TO. Let Tl = TO U {u,+1). In 
PP = T& delete edge a1u2, replace it by edge a, q, and finally rename u1 by calling 
it v~+~. Denote by Ti the graph obtained from Tk in this way. Now repeat the 
process by choosing u,,+~ E T- Tl such that w”+~ is adjacent to some Uj E Tr. Let 
T2 = T1 U{u,+,). Next, form the tree T;1 from T; by deleting edge ~2~3, replacing 
it by edge a,+ and renaming a2 by u,,+~. Repeat this procedure now, building up 
trees Tr and Tie The process clearly terminates after p - n steps, at which time 
T- = T. Trivially, the correspondence fIj* ui is an isomorphism from Tb_, to T. 
H\n”ce this procedure enables us to grow the tree T from the path PP, by 
successively removing end-vertices x in PP from vertices y of degree 2, and 
reattaching these vertices somewhere lse in the tree. 
The following theorem investigates the effect that each single step in the 
procedure outlined above has on the number SK(G, b) of the affected graph. 
Theorem 1. Let G be any graph on p vertices. Let x be any vertex of G, which is 
adjacent to vertex y, and let z be any vertex of G which is not adjacent to x. Let G’ 
be the graph obtained from G by deleting edge xy, and replacing it by edge xz. Then 
for all natural numbers b, we have 
SK(G’, b) = SK(G, b)+ 
p-degz-2 
b - 1 
Proof. The proof splits into three parts. We first prove the following result. 
(a) Suppose x, y are two adjacent vertices in G. If graph H is obtained from G 
by deleting edge xy, then 
SK(H,b)=SK(G,b)- p-;g;-lj-(p-~g;-‘). 
/ 
To prove (a), we choose any subversive strategy %, and compare the numbers 
K&13, b) and &(G, b). These two numbers are clearly the same if either 
% n {x, y} = fl or {x, y}c %. If % n{x, y} = {x}, then vertex y is betrayed in H only 
if CB contains a second neighbour of y; otherwise % n N(y) = {x}, and for such 
strategies we have & (k?, b) = K& (G, b) - 1. It is clear that there exist (p-$?!r--l) 
strategies of this type. If we reverse the roles of x and y in the above argument, 
we also find (p-dbe_g;-* ) strategies Ce with the property that % n {x, y) = {y} = 
Ce n N(x), and K&f, b) = K,(G, b) - 1. Now summing the KGB-numbers for N 
and G over all strategies yields the result for (a). 
In a similar vein we prove the next result. 
(b) Suppose vertices x, y are not adjacent in G. If graph H is obtained from G 
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by adding edge xy, thzn 
SK(H, b) = SK(G, b)+ 
p-degy-2 
b-l 
To prove (b), we let deg x = at and deg y = /3 in G. Then in H, we have 
deg x = QL + 1 and deg y = p + 1. Going now from H to G by again deleting edge 
xy and using (a), we obtain 
Solving this equation for SK(H, b) yields the result for (b). 
Ic) We now prove the theorem. It is clear that we can go from G to G’ via the 
intermediate graph H which is obtained from G by deleting edge xy. Adding edge 
xz in H then yields the desired graph G’. In G, let deg x = CR, deg y = p and 
deg z = y. Using (a), we obtain 
SK(H, b) = SK( G, b) - (“,*T l)-(Pbp; ‘). 
Now in H, degx=at - 1 and deg z = ‘y, and using (b), we obtain 
SK(G’, b) = SK(H, b)+ P+;)-2)+(P7;2)_ 
Employing the first equation to eliminate the occurence of the term SK(H, b) in 
the second yields the desired result. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
Observe that in the statement of the theorem, we have imposed no restrictions 
on the graph G. Note also that the change in the random KGB number as we go 
from G to G’ depends only on the degrees of vertices y and z, and not on the 
degree of x. Thus it is immaterial whether x is an end-vertex of G or an internal 
vertex (i.e., not an end-vertex). In fact, in uhat follows, we will always be moving 
end-vertices, in line -with the procedure outlined earlier by which we can grow any 
tree from the path. 
We note a number of immediate corollaries to Theorem 1. 
Chrollaq 1.1. If deg y s deg z, then SK( G’, b) s SK( G, b), with equality occurring 
only if p-degy-l<b-1. 
This follows at once from the formula in Theorem 1. The same is true for the 
following corollary. 
tilrouary 1.2. If deg y = deg z + 1, then SK(G’, h) = SK(G, b). 
Note that if b 2 p - 1, then any subversive strategy will totally be.;ay the 
network G. If this case, lvhich is uninteresting, does not Ifcur, we have b < p - 1, 
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which can be rewritten as b-lop-3 or b-lcp-degy-I, if degy=2. This 
enables us to state the next corollary. 
CoroWy 1.3. If b < p - 1, deg y = 2, and z is an internal vertex, then SK(G’, b) < 
SK@, b). 
Let us now proceed in our quest for k-secure graphs with minimum random 
KGB number. As noted above, we shall assume b < p - 1. 
Lemma A indicates the manner in which the random KGB number of a tree T 
on p vertices is related to that of the path. 
Lemma A. Consider a tree T on p vertices where the vertices have been labelled so 
that the degree sequence d(u,), d(t)*), . . . , d(v,) is such that d(v,)a d(v,) 3. l l 2 
d (u,). Let d (v,,,, 1) be the first term in the sequence whose value is less than three. 
For a fixed b, 
SK(T, b)=SK(P’, b)+ f ‘(T-l [(“,i;‘)-(;I;)] . 
i-1 j-2 
Proof. As outlined previously, in p - (d + 1) steps [where d is the diameter of T], 
we can form T from the path on p vertices. Each time we attach a vertex to a 
member of {vl, v2, . . . . v,,,) we make a contribution [see Theorem I] to the double 
sum in the statement of the lemma. If we group these contributions o that those 
which arose from attaching vertices to Vi, for a fixed i E {1,2, . . . , m}, are 
together, we have the inner sum for that particular i. The lemma follows 
immediately. 
C~r~lbry A.l. Two trees with identical degree sequences have the same random 
KGB number. 
Let cu(T’) represent he set of end-vertices of a tree T. The following observa- 
tion will be useful. 
Lemma B. If a tree T on p vertices has degree sequence d( v,), d(v2), . . . , d(u,) 
where d(v,)ad(v,)a* l .ad(u,) and d(v,+l ) is the first term in the sequence with 
value less than three, then 
,,, d(q)--1 
c c (l)=la(T)I-2. 
i-1 js2 
Proof. The lemma follows directly from the procedure of forming T from the 
path on p vertices. 
Consider the set of trees (on p vertices) with a fixed number of end-vertices. 
Theorem 2 characterizes those which are optimal. 
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Theorem 2. Let TI and T2 be two trees on p vertices where Icy (TI)I = la( T,)I > 2. 
Suppose Tr has exactily one vertex of degree greater than two. Then, for b fixed, 
SK(T,, b)GK(T,, b). 
Proof. Let the degree sequence of T1 be d(v,), d(vz), . . . , d(u,)) where d(u,)a 
3 > C&J,) a d(vl) 2. l l :ad(u,) = 1 and of Tz be d(u,), d(u2), . . . , d(w,) where 
d(ul)ad(uZ)a l l l 2 d(t+,). By Lemma B we see that we make the same number 
of contributions to the double sum expressed in Lemma A for both T’t and TZ. 
Clearly we minimize this double sum by having m = 1. That is, for a fixed 6, 
SK(T,, b)s SK(T,, b). 
Corollary 2.1. Let T1 and Tz be two trees on p vertices with IcR(TJ > la(‘l;)l. 
Suppose Tr has exactly one vertex of degree greater thaiiz two. Then, for a fixed b, 
SK(T,, b)<SK(T,, 6). 
Proof. Consider T3 on p vertices where 1a(T3)l = Icx(T~)I and T3 has exactly one 
vertex of degree greater than two. In the event Tz is the path we already know 
(see 14)) that the corollary holds. By Theorem 2, SK( Tj, b)d SK(T,, b). By 
Lemma A, SK( T,, b) < SK(T,, (b) and thus the corollary is established. 
We now consider the problem of designing a resistance movemerr on p agents 
so that it is k-secure and has its random KGB number a minimum, For a fixed p 





Theorem 3. For a fixed p and b and a fixed k, let T be a 
k-secure. Then RK(T, 6) is greater than or equal to the 
S(p, k). 
tree on p vertices which is 
random KGB number of 
Proof. T must have at least k + 1 internal vertices (otherwise k subversions would 
destroy T). Therefore T must have at most p - (k + 1) end-vertices. Since S(p, k) 
has exactly p - (k + 1) end-vertices and has exactly one vertex of degree greater 
than two, applying Theorem 2 and Corollary 2.1 the Theorem follows. 
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These results provide useful insight into the manner in which the random KGB 
number of a tree is affected by changes in either the number of end-vertices in the 
tree, or the way in which these end-vertices are linked to internal vertices. For 
problems of a similar flavour, the reader is referred to [l] and [S]. 
References ,c 
F.T. Boesch and A.P. Felzer, A general class of invulnerable graphs, Networks 2 (1972) 261-283. 
S. Loodman and D. Shier, On designing a reliable hierarchical structure, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 
32(2) (March 1977) 418-430. 
G. Gunther and B.L. Hartnell, On minimizing the effects of betrayals in a resistance movement, 
Proc. Eighth Manitoba Conference on Numerical Mathematics and Computing (1978). 
B.L. Hartnell, the optimum defense against random subversions in a network, Proceedings of the 
Tenth Southeastern Conference on Combinatorics, Graph Theory, and Computing, Boca Raton, 
Florida, (April 1979) 293-299. 
G.J. Simmons, Command graphs, Colloquia Mathematics Societatis Janos Botyai 10 (1973) 
1277-1349. 
